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1. Introduction 
It is well known that the traditional sources of financial intermediation are not well 
suited to support entrepreneurial innovation. Banks lend their money to low risk 
borrowers with collateral who can make timely payments of interest and principal. Most 
innovative firms, and particularly those that are newly created, do not meet these 
standards and are often denied credits and doomed to years of financial struggle. 
 
Amid this gloom, venture capitalists (VCs) have been identified as the “free-market” 
answer to the financial problems of innovative start-ups. The main attribute of VCs is 
that they do not loan money in the style of traditional financial intermediaries: they do 
not ask for interest payments or collateral and yet they put money in the firm and bear 
the associated risks. If the firm grows to become profitable VCs get a share of the 
benefits, but if it fails VCs end up with nothing. In order to minimize this risk, VCs not 
only invest in the companies but they also take an active role in monitoring and helping 
them. In Botazzi and da Rin [1]’s words, “a non-financial “soft” side consisting of 
mentoring and monitoring complements the financial “hard” side of the capital 
contribution” (p. 235). All these particularities of VCs have led to the somewhat 
widespread belief that technology-oriented VCs are the ideal partners for financing 
corporate research and, in so doing, spurring entrepreneurial innovation.   
 
Despite this conviction, the fact that VCs are of such benefit to innovation is not so 
clear-cut. A number of articles provide evidence that venture capital (VC) spurs 
innovation (Kortum and Lerner [2]; Mollica and Zingales [3]), while others contend that 
VCs convert science-oriented firms into business-oriented firms, thereby thwarting 
innovation (Engel and Keilbach [4]; Caselli, Gatti and Perrini [5]; Ueda and Hirukawa 
[6]). Correctly establishing the sequence in which VC investments and innovation take 
place is crucial to design effective policies for stimulating innovation. If innovation 
were to take place upon the entry of VC, policymakers could rely on VC as an 
innovation factor per se. However, if innovation took place before the entry of VC and 
VCs simply exploited those innovations, VC alone would not suffice to promote 
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innovation and would need to be complemented with other sources of pre-innovation 
financing.  
 
In this paper I seek to assert whether VCs simply focus on the commercialization of 
already existing innovations or also stimulate the innovativeness of their portfolio firms. 
The study is based on a dataset containing 119 VC-financed firms and 164,486 control 
firms which is the result of merging 1) self-collected data on roughly the entire 
population of Spanish high-tech firms that received VC investments between 2003 and 
2007 with 2) patent data from the Spanish Patent and Trademark Office (OEPM), the 
European Patent Office (EPO) and the United States Patent and Trademark Patent 
Office (USPTO) and 3) financial data from the BvD’s SABI database.  
 
A common problem in this literature is the reverse causality in play between VC and 
innovation, which makes it difficult to establish whether VC funding causes innovation 
or innovation causes VC funding. This problem, however, is more acute in studies that 
use aggregated data (such as industry data) and I partly circumvent it by using firm-
level data. Micro data, nevertheless, converts the reverse causality problem into a self-
selection problem given that venture-funded firms are selected after intensive screening 
processes on the basis of superior performance. The failure to account for this 
phenomenon leads to inflated estimates of the contribution of VC to firm performance. 
My identification strategy will consist in matching venture-funded firms with non 
venture-funded firms that are equally likely to receive VC (conditional on their 
observable characteristics) prior to the VC investment. The matching partners will be 
used to build a counterfactual against which to compare the performance of venture-
funded firms and so to estimate an average treatment effect. The implementation of 
matching estimators is plausible in the given context because venture-funded firms are 
observed before and after the entry of VC. Moreover, I observe a significant number of 
VC-funding determinants, which helps address the selection problem. In addition, the 
availability of a huge number of potential controls ensures the presence of suitable 
matches.   
 
This paper contributes most directly to the empirical literature on VC and innovation 
(which I will discuss in detail in section 2), but also to the literature on VC and firm 
performance (see Hellman and Puri [7]; Engel [8]) and, more broadly, to the literature 
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on the financing of innovation activities (see Hall [9] and Hall and Lerner [10] for two 
extensive surveys). One of the original contributions of this study is that, while existing 
articles consider the investments made by all types of VCs, I focus only on high-tech 
oriented VCs. This demarcation is important because VCs differ widely in their 
investment criteria and some are simply not interested in innovative activities. Such 
VCs are not expected to have a positive impact on firms’ innovative performance and 
their inclusion might lead to underestimates of the role of truly innovation-oriented 
VCs. Another differential feature of this paper is that it not only reports estimates for 
the whole sample of VC-backed firms, but also for a finer breakdown by investment 
stage (early vs. late stage) and ownership of VCs (public vs. private). This focus on 
specific sub-samples allows me to assess the effectiveness of different types of VC 
investments, which is an interesting exercise with relevant policy implications. For 
instance, the existence of public support programs should be reconsidered if public VCs 
were found to be badly designed. On the other hand, early stage investments should be 
encouraged if they were found to achieve better results than late stage investments. 
 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
literature. Section 3 presents the data. In section 4, I describe the estimation strategy. 
Section 5 verifies the accuracy of the matches. Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 
concludes.  
 
2. Literature review 
The empirical literature on VC and innovation is divided into two groups. One provides 
evidence that VC spurs innovation; the other provides evidence that VC thwarts 
innovation. The former group is exclusively comprised of studies that use US industry 
data. The latter comprises papers that also draw on other sources including firm level 
data from European countries, qualitative evidence from specific case studies and 
personal opinions from entrepreneurs and VC professionals. In what follows I review all 
the empirical articles that shape the state of the art on VC and innovation. These articles 
are also schematically summarized in Table 1.  
 
Zucker, Dardy and Brewer [11] study the determinants of the creation of biotech firms 
in the US. Although they do not explicitly analyze the relationship between VC and 
innovation, they are the first to provide a causal effect of VC on a variable considered as 
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being highly linked to innovation. To avoid simultaneity problems, they use the number 
of venture capital firms active in 1981 (in each of the 183 US regions of their sample) to 
study the creation of biotech firms in 1990. They find that, controlling for the presence 
of intellectual capital, the size of the venture capital market negatively affected the 
creation of biotech firms. They interpret this negative effect, however, as evidence that 
VCs did play an active role in the formation of entrant firms which resulted in fewer 
albeit larger firms.  
 
Kortum and Lerner [2] can genuinely be considered the first authors to explicitly study 
the relationship between VC and innovation. They propose a patent production function 
with two inputs, R&D and VC, to evaluate the patenting activity of twenty US 
manufacturing industries between 1965 and 1992. They use a 1979 change to the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act that induced US pension funds to invest in 
VC as an instrument for VC investments and find VC to have a significant influence on 
patented inventions. Indeed their results suggest that a dollar of VC is three times more 
potent in stimulating innovation than a dollar of traditional corporate R&D. Similarly, 
Mollica and Zingales [3] also report evidence of a positive impact of VC on innovation 
using US industry data. They instrument the size of VC investments with the size of 
state pension fund’s assets and find VC investments to have a significant positive effect 
both on the production of patents and on the creation of new businesses.  
 
Related articles in the literature, however, seem to contradict Kortum and Lerner [2] and 
Mollica and Zingales [3]. For instance, Engel and Keilbach [4] use a sample of German 
start-ups that received venture capital between 1995 and 1998 and find that while VC-
funded firms have a higher number of patent applications than comparable firms before 
receiving VC; this difference vanishes after the investment is made. Growth rates of 
VC-funded firms, however, are still significantly larger than those of non-VC funded 
counterparts after the investment. This suggests that patents attract VC investments 
while VC does not improve firms’ patenting output. If anything VCs seem to focus on 
the commercialization of existing patents and on the growth of invested firms. Caselli, 
Gatti and Perrini [5] study a sample containing 37 venture-backed and 116 non venture-
backed firms that went public between 1995 and 2004 and find the same results as 
Engel and Keilbach [4]. These results are largely in agreement with Stuck and 
Weingarten [12] who only find a tiny fraction of the 823 electronic high-tech initial 
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offerings they track to be highly innovative. They claim that VCs thwart innovation and 
force their portfolio firms to become more business oriented for three main reasons. 
Firstly, VCs are not the risk takers they are often made out to be. Secondly, the short 
life cycle of VC funds does not allow for innovations to mature. And lastly, VCs 
general partners are more business oriented than science oriented.  
 
Haeussler, Harhoff and Müller [13] back Engel and Keilbach [4]’s and Caselli, Gatti 
and Perrini [5]’s perception that patents attract VC. They analyze a representative 
sample of 190 German and British biotech firms (of which 87 received VC) that were 
founded after 1990 and find that having filed at least one patent substantially reduces 
(about 76%) the time to the first capital investment. Moreover, they also find that 
ventures with higher patent quality receive VC faster, which indicates that investors 
value quality and are able to screen it. Similarly, Hellman and Puri (2000) study a hand-
collected database of 173 start-up companies located in Silicon Valley and find that 
innovators are more likely to be financed by VC firms than imitators. In addition, they 
also find that the presence of VC is associated with faster time to market.  
 
Ueda and Hirukawa [6] explicitly study the reverse causality between VC and 
innovation using the industry data of nineteen US manufacturing sectors observed 
during the years 1968 to 2001. They ask whether it really is VC that causes innovation 
or the other way around. Using an AR regression, and working with the Granger 
causality concept, they find that lagged TFP growth explains present VC investments, 
but that the opposite does not occur. Indeed, they find lagged VC investments to be 
negatively correlated with present TFP growth. Induced by these findings, Ueda and 
Hirukawa [14] replicate Kortum and Lerner [2]’s paper using not only patents but also 
TFP growth as a measure of innovation. Like Kortum and Lerner [2], they find VC to 
have a significant influence on patented inventions. However, they cannot find VC to 
have any significant effect on TFP growth.  
 
In addition to reviewing the scientific literature, it is also interesting to examine the 
interest of venture capitalists to finance R&D so as to get a better understanding of the 
relationship between VC and innovation. Sonnek [15], from SEB Venture Capital, 
explains that “venture capitalists dislike having to finance R&D. For us to be interested 
in financing a project, most of the R&D should be in place already”. It is equally 
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enlightening to listen to high-tech entrepreneurs who have received VC investments. 
According to Wadhwa [16] “we perfected our innovative technology long before we 
raised venture capital. (…) After receiving venture capital, our only focus was on sales 
and marketing”. 
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Table 1. Survey of the available evidence on VC and innovation 
Author Data Dependent variable Independent variables Methodology  Findings 
Evidence that VC spurs innovation 
Kortum and Lerner [2] Twenty U.S. manufacturing industries between 1965 and 1992 
U.S. patents issued to U.S. 
investors by industry and date of 
application on patent 
Venture funding (collected by 
Venture Economics) and 
industrial R&D expenditures 
(collected by the U.S. 
National Science Foundation) 
They propose a patent 
production function in which 
R&D and VC are the inputs. 
Reduced-form regressions are 
estimated both by OLS and IV.  
1) VC and R&D are highly substitutable; 2) VC 
has a significant influence on patented inventions: 
A dollar of VC is about three times more potent 
in stimulating innovation than a dollar of 
traditional corporate R&D 
Mollica and Zingales  
[3] 
Venture capital investments (at 
the industry level?) in the United 
States  
Patents and new businesses VC investment per capita OLS and instrumental variables 
1) A one standard deviation increase in the VC 
investment per capita generates an increase in the 
number of patents between 4 and 15%; 2) An 
increase of 10% in the volume of VC investment 
increases the total number of new businesses by 
2.5%.  
Evidence that innovations take place before VC investments and/or VC thwarts innovation 
Ueda and Hirukawa [6] U.S. manufacturing firms Patent count, TFP growth and VC 
Patent count (from the 
NBER), TFP growth (from 
the NBER productivity 
database and own calculation) 
and VC (VentureXpert) 
They work with the concept of 
Granger causality: estimate 
whether lags of VC help predict 
TFP growth and innovation 
(and vice versa) 
1) Lagged TFP growth explains present VC 
investments, but the opposite does not occur; 2) 
Indeed, past VC investments are negatively 
correlated with present TFP growth.  
Ueda and Hirukawa [14] Nineteen U.S. manufacturing industries between 1968 and 2001 
U.S. patents issued to U.S. 
investors by industry and date of 
application on patent (from 
NBER) and TFP (from the NBER 
productivity database) 
Venture funding (from 
VentureXpert) and industrial 
R&D expenditures (collected 
by the U.S. National Science 
Foundation) 
Replicate Kortum and Lerner 
(2000) 
1) VC has a significant influence on patented 
inventions; 2) VC has no impact on TFP. 
Engel and Keilbach [4] 
Microdata on German firms. 
Covers all start-ups that received 
venture capital between 1995 and 
1998: 142 treatments (or venture-
funded) and 21,375 controls. 
Firm growth (rate of average 
annual employment growth) and 
Innovative behavior (count data 
on patent applications at the 
German Patent Office).   
A number of firm-specific 
variables such as number of 
employees, foundation date, 
sector, etc. 
Non parametric matching 
procedures. 
1) Firms with higher innovative output have a 
larger probability of getting VC; 2) Venture-
funded firms are not more innovative than their 
counterparts; 3) but display significantly higher 
growth rates. 
Caselli, Gatti and Perrini 
[5] 
A microlevel dataset of 37 
venture-backed and 116 non 
venture-backed firms that went 
public between 1995 and 2004 
Patent count and sales growth Not available Non parametric matching procedures. 
1) Having patents seems a requirement to passing 
the VC's selection process; 2) entry of VC into the 
company does not promote continued innovation 
(indeed it seems to slow it down); 3) sales growth 
of VC funded firms is higher.  
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Table 1. Survey of the available evidence on VC and innovation (continuation) 
Author Data Dependent variable Independent variables Methodology  Findings 
Evidence that innovations take place before VC investments and/or VC thwarts innovation 
Haeussler, Harhoff and 
Müller [13] 
Representative sample of active 
(in 2006) German and British 
biotechnology firms that were 
founded after 1990. 87 firms 
received VC and 103 did not 
The time that the company 
receives the first VC financing 
Dummy of patent application, 
patent application stock and 
average number of citations 
Hazard rate analysis (Cox 
proportional hazard model) 
1) Having filed at least one application reduces 
the time to the first VC investment by 76%; 2) 
ventures with higher patent quality receive VC 
faster which indicates that investors value quality 
and that they are able to screen it  
Hellman and Puri [7] 
Hand-collected database of 173 
start-up companies located in 
California’s Silicon Valley.  
Dummy indicating whether the 
firm receives VC financing, time 
to VC (time from the birth to the 
date of obtaining VC for the first 
time), time to market (time from 
the birth to the date of first 
product sale).  
Dummy indicating whether 
the firm is innovator or 
imitator, dummy indicating 
whether the firm has received 
VC or not.  
Probit for studying the 
determinants of VC financing, 
Cox estimations for studying 
time to VC and also for 
studying time to market.  
1) Innovator firms are more likely to be financed 
by VC than imitators; 2) Innovators obtain VC 
earlier in the life cycle than do imitators; 3) The 
presence of VC is associated with faster time to 
market.  
Zucker, Darby and 
Brewer [11] 
Panel for 14 years (1976-1989) 
and 183 US regions (functional 
economic areas). 
Number of Biotech start-ups 
Number of venture capital 
firms in a region legally 
eligible to finance start-ups in 
each year up to 1981. Fixing 
the number of firms at the 
levels of 1981 avoids 
simultaneity problems.  
Poisson regressions on the sock 
of biotech firms.  
1) Controlling for the presence of intellectual 
capital, the size of the venture capital market 
negatively affected the creation of biotech firms. 
Stuck and Weingarten 
[12] 
 
Venture capitalists 
823 electronic high-tech initial 
public offerings for a 10-year 
period ending in 2002. 
QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS: 1) Out of the total number of firms that received VC, only 20 (4.4%) and 5 firms (1.4%) were found to be highly 
innovative from 1993 to 1996 and 1997 to 2002 respectively.  
 
QUALITATIVE EXPLANATIONS: 1) VCs are not the risk takers they are often made out to be; 2) The short life cycle for venture funds has dramatic 
consequences for innovation; 3) VCs general partners are more business oriented than science oriented.    
Sonnek [15] 
 
Venture capitalist 
Not available 
“There are good reasons to work with venture-capital companies on corporate innovations –just so long as you don’t expect them to pay for your R&D. 
(…) venture capitalists dislike having to finance R&D. For us to be interested in financing a project, most of the R&D should be in place already. If there 
is too much development left, it indicates there is still some technical risk, as well as making it difficult to estimate a commercial value. ” 
Wadhwa [16] 
 
High tech entrepreneur 
Not available 
“In both of our companies, we perfected our innovative technology long before we raised venture capital. And then we put significant effort into patenting 
part of our technology. Yes, we wanted to protect our assets, but this wasn’t the key motivator –it was to make the company more attractive to venture 
capitalists, who we knew put a premium on patents. After receiving venture capital, our only focus was on sales and marketing. Technology development 
became a second priority.” 
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Ueda and Hirukawa [17] argue that the apparently conflicting results of Kortum and 
Lerner [2] and Mollica and Zingales [3], on the one hand, and the remaining papers, on 
the other, are not necessarily incompatible. They point out that even if VCs only 
focused on the commercialization phase, they might still stimulate innovation by acting 
as an incentive: entrepreneurs could be more willing to innovate if they expected VC to 
help them in the commercialization stage. This conjecture goes beyond the scope of this 
paper but should be explored in future research.   
 
My paper is most closely aligned with those of Engel and Keilbach [4] and Caselli, 
Gatti and Perrini [5] in the sense that I also use firm-level data and study the importance 
of 1) previous patent applications in attracting VC investments and 2) that of VC 
investments in spurring patenting activity and sales growth of financed firms. In 
contrast with these papers, however, I exclusively consider VCs that invest in 
innovative firms. Moreover, I provide results for different typologies of VC 
investments.  
 
3. Data 
This paper combines data from three different sources: 1) self-collected data on roughly 
the entire population of Spanish high-tech firms that received VC investments between 
2003 and 2005, 2) patent data from the Spanish Patent and Trademark Office (OEPM), 
the European Patent Office (EPO) and the United States Patent and Trademark Patent 
Office (USPTO) and 3) financial data from the BvD’s SABI database. In what follows, 
I describe the three datasets.  
 
(1) Venture capital – The VC data has been obtained from several official sources, as 
well as from an exhaustive search across VCs websites and by phone calls to the VCs 
when relevant information was missing.  
 
The main target was to obtain a sample as close as possible to the population of high-
tech firms (or firms that conducted innovation activities) that received VC investments 
in Spain between the years 2003 and 2005 (both inclusive). In order to identify those 
firms, I began by creating a list of all VCs that operate in Spain (that is, both Spanish 
and foreign VCs that invest in Spain) and declare that they invest in high-tech and 
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innovative firms. This was not a difficult task because VCs are very specific in their 
investment criteria and always state their orientation on their website. Besides this 
group of unambiguously high-tech oriented VCs, I also considered a group of generalist 
VCs who also seem to focus some of their interest on innovative firms.   
 
With this list at hand, I began a search across several official sites that provide 
information on VC investments: BvD’s Zephir database, VentureXpert database and the 
Capital&Corporate yearbooks. Unfortunately, these three sources together do not 
provide a complete coverage of the whole population of high-tech VC investments. 
Hence, I complemented this first list with a search across the websites of all the VCs 
that operate in Spain. In some cases, however, it was impossible to infer the year when 
the investment was made or the nature of the investment (seed, start-up, development, 
MBO or MBI). These two sets of information are essential for the present study. The 
year of investment is necessary given that I want to match venture-funded firms with 
non-venture firms that have similar pre-investment characteristics. The type of 
investment is also important because I want to make sure that I only include VC 
investments (seed, start-up and development investments) while exclude private equity 
investments (MBOs and MBIs) that are not strictly speaking VC. Consequently, I 
initiated a round of phone calls to all the VCs for whom some information was missing 
(in practice, virtually the entire sample). This procedure proved very helpful because it 
not only yielded the missing information but also served to get valuable feedback from 
VCs about the quality of my data.  
 
It can be appreciated in Table 2 that the number of high-tech venture-funded firms I 
have collected is consistent with the numbers reported by the European Venture Capital 
Association (EVCA). This indicates that my data contain almost the entire population of 
high-tech investments that took place during the years 2003 to 2005. Indeed, in most of 
the years I have more high-tech firms than those registered by the EVCA. This is not 
surprising given that I have been rather conservative in order to lower the risk of 
involuntarily excluding high-tech firms. Of all the investments I found, some were not 
properly speaking VC and I had to discard them. In some other cases, I either could not 
find the firms in the SABI database or they were in the SABI database but were lacking 
relevant information, which also led to their being excluded from the final econometric 
analysis. In the end, there are 119 firms that received (first round) VC investments 
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during the years 2003 to 2005 for which all the necessary information is fully available. 
This roughly amounts to 30% of the population of VC investments that were made 
during these years according to the EVCA.  
 
Table 2. Number of high-tech firms that received VC according to the 
EVCA and to my data 
  2003 2004 2005 Total  
EVCA data 110 122 172 404 
My data     
 All firms found 171 141 193 505 
 Proper VC investments a 147 117 152 416 
 Proper VC investments found in SABI 110 75 79 264 
 Included in the econometric analysis b 43 36 40 119 
Notes: a By proper investments I refer to those investments that can be 
deemed seed capital, start-up or expansion (and rule out all the other 
types of investments that are not VC). b I only include within the 
econometric analysis the firms found in the SABI for which I have no 
missing information.  
 
 
(2) Patents – Firms’ innovative behaviour is measured using patent applications made to 
the OEMP, the EPO and the USPTO to proxy the number of innovations produced by 
each firm. As is common, I use patent applications instead of granted patents because 
several years may elapse between the submission of an application and the granting of 
the patent. In consequence, patent applications are a better proxy for the ideas invented 
at a certain point in time. In the remaining of the article it should be borne in mind that 
whenever I refer to patenting I always refer to patent applications. While it is well 
known that patents are an imperfect measure of innovation (given that not all 
innovations are patented), it is the best measure to which I have access. Besides, they 
have been shown to be a better measure of research productivity than R&D (Griliches 
[18]). I have information of all the granted patent applications that were filed during the 
years 2000 to 2008, which consists of a total of 40,378 OEPM patents, 13,415 EPO 
patents and 1,469 USPTO patents.  
 
(3) Financial information – The accounting information has been obtained from SABI. 
The main advantage of the SABI database is that it has a large coverage and contains, 
among the more than million firms that configure the whole database, most of the VC-
funded firms in my sample. In addition, it includes many firms that are likely to be good 
controls for the VC-funded firms. As potential controls I take all the 180,000 firms that 
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show up in the SABI for more than 5 years, are available for the years 2003 to 2008, 
belong to industries with at least one venture-funded firm and were founded after 1994. 
Moreover, I also take a random sample of 40,000 firms that were founded prior to 1994. 
The characteristics taken from the SABI are firms’ name, province, industry, age, 
number of employees, sales, operating profits and export status.   
 
These three sets of information are merged using Stata’s Reclink routine. The string 
used to carry out the matching is firms’ name. I also experimented using a multiple 
criteria based not only on firms’ name, but also on their address and zip code. However, 
it performed notably worse.  
 
3.1. A first look at the data 
The match resulted in a dataset containing 120,000 firms observed over several years, 
making a total of 961,784 firm-year observations. In order to construct some of the 
endogenous and explanatory variables, I need to observe each firm for at least four 
years: two years after the VC investment (to measure the sales growth rate in the two 
years following funding) and two years before the VC investment (to know the sales 
growth rate in the two years preceding funding). After deleting the observations that 
were observed for less than four years or for which information was missing, I ended up 
with 119 VC-funded firms and 164,486 non VC-funded observations.  
 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the various subgroups. It is reassuring to see 
that the 119 VC-funded firms included in the analysis (shown in column 2) do not differ 
much from the 264 VC-funded firms found in the SABI database (shown in column 1). 
It seems that the firms considered in the analysis are slightly more innovative, older and 
larger and export more. By contrast, they present lower sales and profit growth rates. 
These differences, however, are not severe and it is possible to conclude that the sample 
used in the analysis is strongly representative of the larger sample of firms found in the 
SABI.  
 
The differences between the VC-funded firms included in the analysis and the non VC-
funded firms (column 7) are remarkable. VC-funded firms patent more (12% of VC-
funded firms patent while only 1% of non VC-funded firms do so), more intensively 
(0.227 patents per firm against 0.016) and are more likely to export (38.7% of VC-
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funded firms export while only 8.2% of non VC-funded firms do so). Their sales are 
more than four times as large as those of non VC-funded firms, as are their sales’ 
growth rates. Profit growth rates, however, do not differ. There are no substantial 
differences in age either. VC-funded firms, though, are considerably larger both in 
terms of number of workers and in total assets. Finally, VC firms are more likely to be 
private limited companies as opposed to limited liability corporations and have notably 
larger cash flows.      
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
   VC firms included in the econometric analysis   
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
 
All VC 
firms  All Public Private 
Early 
stage 
Late 
stage  
No VC 
firms 
Patent application  0.103  0.118 0.061 0.209 0.118 0.113  0.010
No. of Patents 0.164  0.227 0.076 0.488 0.118 0.296  0.016
Exporter dummy 0.272  0.387 0.409 0.372 0.294 0.479  0.082
Sales  11,041  10,285 11,066 9,827 4,325 14,673  2,511
Sales growth rate 38  4 5 2 10 1  1
Profits growth rate 9  0 -2 3 -2 -1  0
Age 9  13 13 12 9 16  9
Workers 69  71 63 74 33 93  19
Total assets 14,750  11,424 11,686 9,885 6,947 14,462  1,773
Private limited 0.624  0.521 0.515 0.558 0.529 0.465  0.868
Cash flow 613  565 589 658 102 849  127
     
Number of 
observations a 133/213  119 66 43 34 71  164,486
Notes: sample means are reported for each variable. More detailed descriptive statistics for each 
subgroup (with the standard errors, the minimum and the maximum values) are reported in the 
appendix. The means are calculated over firms’ pre-VC characteristics. a Obviously, not all the 
information is available for the 264 VC-funded firms found in the SABI database. This is the reason 
why some have been excluded from the final analysis. Consequently, the means in column (1) have 
been calculated over the number of firms for which the corresponding variable is available (which 
ranges from 133 to 213 depending on the variable).   
 
 
As regards the ownership of the VCs, Brander, Egar and Hellman [19] point out that a 
good public support program should be characterised by a considerable selection effect 
and a reduced treatment effect. The selection effect refers to the fact that public VCs 
should increase the equilibrium quantity of VC to the socially efficient level by 
investing in firms that are not profitable to private investors. We should, hence, observe 
public VCs investing in “inferior” firms rather than competing for projects that are 
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attractive to private investors. Similarly, we should also expect public VCs to invest in 
more innovative firms in order to promote the creation of spillovers. This, however, 
does not seem to be the case. On the one hand public VCs invest less in innovative 
firms than do private VCs. On the other hand, public VCs invest more heavily in 
exporting companies and in firms with both larger sales and sales growth rates 
(although lower profits growth rates). In the case of the remaining characteristics (age, 
size, and cash flows), there seem to be no important differences. Therefore, public VCs 
apparently compete with private VCs for similar quality firms instead of favouring 
either more innovative or more handicapped firms. This evidence suggests that the 
“selection effect” requirement is not met. In the results section (section 6) I will discuss 
whether the second desirable feature of a well-designed public VC policy, namely the 
“no treatment effect”, is met. The “no treatment effect” requirement implies that once 
we control for selection, public VCs should be equally effective as private VCs at 
stimulating both firms’ innovation and sales growth rates. Therefore, it is necessary to 
carry out a proper econometric analysis to verify its validity.  
 
Finally, the breakdown by investment stage provides very intuitive numbers: early stage 
investments are directed at younger and smaller firms which patent less, export less and 
have lower sales but which report much larger sales growth rates.  
 
Besides looking at the descriptive statistics, it is also interesting to examine the 
evolution in firms’ performance before and after VC entry. Figure 1 plots the evolution 
of sales, the share of patenting firms and the number of patent applications both for the 
firms that receive VC and for some suitable controls that are equally likely to receive 
VC1. It can be appreciated that the sales of VC-funded firms unambiguously grow more 
than those of the controls after VC entry. Nevertheless, the impact on patent 
applications is less clear. There is a sudden rise both in the number of firms that apply 
for at least one patent and in the number of patent applications in the precise year of VC 
entry. This boom lasts for one year and then it dissipates with patenting activity 
returning to pre-VC levels. This temporary increase seems to be the cause of VC entry 
rather than a consequence of it. Patentable innovations are generally the result of 
sustained research efforts that tend to last for more than one year and, in this sense, it 
                                                 
1 The method used to select controls is carefully detailed in the econometric section (section 4). 
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seems unlikely that VCs have the ability to immediately boost firms’ patenting activity. 
A more realistic explanation is that, during the screening phase, VCs are possibly able 
to detect firms with advanced research projects that are about to crystallise into 
patentable innovations. However, to evaluate the impact of VC on firms’ performance 
more precisely, it is necessary to implement appropriate evaluation techniques that 
properly correct for such selection. The technique implemented in this paper is 
explained in the next section.    
16
 
 
10
00
0
20
00
0
30
00
0
40
00
0
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
t
Treated Controls
Sales
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
4
.0
5
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
t
Treated Controls
Share of patenting firms
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
t
Treated Controls
Number of patent applications
 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of firms’ performance before and after VC entry 
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4. Estimation method 
If we let iY1  and iY0 denote the potential outcome of firm i  in the presence and absence 
of VC respectively, the causal effect of VC on the performance of firm i  is given by 
ii YY 01 − . Hence, to measure the effect of VC on patent applications and sales growth 
rates we would ideally wish to observe the difference between the firms’ outcome after 
VC funding and the hypothetical outcome without funding. The main problem of causal 
inference, however, is that iY1  and iY0  are not simultaneously observable. Matching 
estimators, nevertheless, allows us to build the missing counterfactual provided that two 
identification conditions are satisfied. These conditions are:  
 
1. XDYY |),( 01 ⊥   (selection on observables) 
2. 01)|1Pr( >−<==< cwithcxXDc  (common support) 
 
Where D  is the indicator of treatment intake which takes the value one if the firm is 
VC-funded and zero otherwise and X  is a matrix of firm covariates.  
 
The first identification condition states that, conditional on certain observable 
characteristics, the treatment is independent of the outcomes. In consequence, if the 
treatment is “random” for firms with similar pre-treatment characteristics, it is possible 
to use the average outcome of similar firms that are not treated to estimate the untreated 
outcome. Put formally, the selection-on-observables assumption implies that 
[ ] [ ]xXDYExXDYE ===== ,0|,1| 00 . This allows us to estimate the average 
treatment effect of VC on firms’ output as 
  
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]xXDYExXDYE
xXDYExXDYEATE
==−===
==−===
,0|,1|
,1|,1|
01
01α  
 
For the selection-on-observables assumption to hold, the set of characteristics included 
in X  should account for all the determinants of VC funding. Although there is no 
formal method to test the validity of the selection-on-observables assumption I seek to 
argue in the next section that the covariates used are sufficient.  
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The second assumption guarantees that for any VC-funded firm with a given covariate 
pattern it is possible to find non VC-funded firms with similar characteristics against 
which to compare them.  
 
If these two conditions are satisfied it is possible to estimate the non-observed outcome 
of any firm using the outcomes of similar firms with the opposite treatment. The 
question, then, becomes how to identify “similar” firms. When X  is multidimensional 
or continuous, as is the case in this paper, it is impossible to find twin treated and 
control firms with exactly the same characteristics. In such cases, “closeness” is defined 
by a distance metric between the multivariate covariate vectors of the treated and the 
controls. A commonly used distance is the Mahalanobis distance: 
)()'(),( 1 jijiji XXSXXXXD −−= − , where iX  is the covariate vector of the treated 
observation i , jX  is the covariate vector of the control j  and S  is the variance-
covariance matrix. In this paper, I will use the bias-corrected nearest-neighbour 
matching estimator proposed by Abadie and Imbens [20], which precisely implements 
the distance measure above defined to match treated and control observations. Abadie 
and Imbens [20] show that the simple matching estimator leads to a non-negligible bias 
if X  contains multiple continuous variables. They propose a bias correction that 
consists in adjusting the estimated counterfactual of i  for the difference between the 
covariates for unit i  and its match.  
 
Matching estimators allow us to calculate the average treatment effect (ATE), the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) and the average treatment effect on the 
controls (ATEC). Here, I am only interested in calculating the ATET given that I wish 
to evaluate whether firms that receive VC do better than they would have done without 
VC. The ATET is calculated as2:  
 
 [ ]∑ −= 1 01
1
ˆ1
N
i
ii YYN
ATET  
 
                                                 
2 To match the treated firms with the controls and estimate the ATET I use the STATA’s nnmatch routine 
described in Abadie et al. [21]. 
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where 1N  is the number of VC-funded firms and iY0ˆ  is the bias-adjusted, estimated 
counterfactual of firm i . Following Abadie et al. [21], I will match each treated firm 
with four controls because it offers the benefit of not relying on too little information. 
Thus, the unobserved outcome of firm i  will be estimated by averaging the observed 
outcomes for the four controls that will be chosen as matches for i .   
 
5. Implementation of the matching procedure 
The vector of covariates X  used in the matching procedure simply includes the 
propensity score (the estimated probability of being VC-funded), which is the most 
widely used variable in the matching literature. I also tried to choose the matches 
applying alternative criteria. For instance, I also added patent and export dummies to the 
X  vector. In addition, I also forced the matched partners to belong to the same industry, 
size stratum and year. None of these efforts, however, produced more accurate matches 
than those obtained with the propensity score alone. In any case, the results obtained 
with this alternative criteria were qualitatively the same and quantitatively very similar. 
 
5.1. Probability of VC funding and validity of the selection-on-observables assumption 
To obtain the propensity score I estimate a probit model in which the dependent 
variable is a dummy with value one if the firm receives VC and zero otherwise. The 
explanatory variables used in the regression are a series of pre-treatment firm 
characteristics that can be considered relevant determinants of VC-funding. Firstly, I 
include a dummy variable with value one if the firm has applied for at least one patent 
up to the present time. This variable aims to approximate the innovative behaviour of 
the firm. It also serves to indicate whether firms have any new product or technology 
that VCs might be interested in. Secondly, I include a dummy that takes the value one if 
the firm exports and zero otherwise. It is well known that exporters have access to larger 
markets and as such enjoy better growth prospects, a fact that attracts VCs. Thirdly, I 
consider sales and profitability growth during the two years preceding VC entry to 
proxy firms’ present and future potential performance. It should be acknowledged that I 
lack information on firms’ managerial ability, which is likely to be an important 
determinant of VC entry. This information is commonly missing, unless surveys with 
specific questions on the topic are available. In the absence of reliable information on 
this dimension, both sales and profits growth rate will partly capture managerial ability. 
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Fourthly, VCs tend to follow specific investment criteria. Some focus on young small 
firms while others concentrate on mature large firms undergoing expansion. To capture 
these preferences I include firms’ age and number of workers. To further control for 
size I also introduce firms’ total assets. Fifthly, I include a dummy with value one if the 
firm is a private limited company and zero if it is a limited liability corporation. The 
reason why I consider this variable is that firms that adopt certain legal entities are less 
accessible owing to their reluctance to relinquish control to external shareholders. 
Induced by a similar rationale, I also introduce firms’ cash flow as an indicator of firms’ 
financial autonomy, given that financially able firms might be less attracted to VC. 
Finally, I include a full set of industry, region (at the province level) and year dummies 
to account for systematic differences in the VC activity across industries and regions, 
and to control for the business cycle.  
 
Table 4. Probit estimate of the propensity score 
Dependent variable: VC dummy 
Patent dummy 0.256     (0.081)*** 
Exporter dummy 0.450     (0.078)*** 
Sales growth rates 0.000    (0.000)** 
Profit growth rates 0.000 (0.001) 
Age 0.001 (0.004) 
Workers 0.000 (0.000) 
Total assets 0.000     (0.000)*** 
Private limited company -0.305     (0.074)*** 
Cash flow 0.000 (0.000) 
Constant -6.431     (0.541)*** 
Industry dummies yes 
Region dummies yes 
Time dummies yes 
    
Observations 176,075 
Adj. R-squared 0.19 
Correctly predicted observations 
 Zeroes 0.61 
  Ones 0.89 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance on a 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. The t-ratios are shown in parentheses. The 
critical value used to classify the predictions is 0.024. 
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The coefficients of the probit estimation are displayed in Table 4. The results suggest 
that previous patent applications are a significant determinant of VC-funding. This 
result is consistent with studies elsewhere that support the “innovation-first” hypothesis. 
Similarly, firms that export and which have high growth rates are more likely to receive 
VC. As opposed to sales growth rate, however, profits growth rate does not seem to 
have any effect on VC participation. Firms’ age and size do not play a major role at 
explaining VC investments, although total assets (another size proxy) do have a positive 
and significant coefficient. Private limited companies show a significantly lower 
probability of receiving VC than limited liability corporations, suggesting that certain 
organizational structures are more open to external partners. Cash flows have an 
insignificant effect on the likelihood of VC participation. As to the industry and region 
dummies, they reveal a great degree of heterogeneity across industries and regions. 
Lastly, it is worth noting that the fit of the model is good as implied by the large number 
of correctly predicted zeroes and ones and the acceptable value of the adjusted R-
squared.   
 
5.2. Comparison of treated and control firms and validity of the common support 
assumption 
To evaluate the quality of the matches, Table 5 compares the mean values of the 
propensity score and the variables included in the probit model for the treated and the 
selected controls. As an additional check of the accuracy of the matches, I also report 
the kernel densities of the propensity score for the treated firms and the selected 
controls.    
 
In Table 3 I showed that the characteristics of VC-funded firms significantly differ from 
those of all the potential controls. Table 5 proves that these discrepancies almost 
disappear when we compare the treated firms with the selected control firms. There is a 
group of variables whose mean is virtually the same for the two subgroups. These 
variables are the propensity score, the exporter dummy, age, size and the private limited 
company dummy. Besides these variables, there is also a group of covariates whose 
mean differs substantially across the two groups. This is the case of the sales growth 
ratio and, to a lesser extent, of the patent dummy (the profit growth rates also differ, but 
since this variable is not significant in the probit estimate this discrepancy is less of a 
concern). These two discrepancies, however, work in a direction that should not cast 
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any doubt on the results. For instance, and advancing some of the results that I will 
present in section 6, regarding the pre-treatment sales growth rate, the mean for the non-
VC funded firms is much larger than the mean for the VC-funded firms and yet I find 
VC to spur sales growth rate. Conversely, while the pre-treatment share of firms that 
apply for at least one patent is larger for VC-funded firms, I cannot find compelling 
evidence that VC spurs patent applications.  
 
Figure 2 plots the kernel densities of the propensity score of the treated and the potential 
controls. The two kernel densities perfectly overlap indicating that the common support 
assumption holds and that the propensity scores of the treated and the selected controls 
are not only identical in their means but also over the whole distribution.  
 
Table 5. Mean comparison of VC-funded firms and selected controls 
 VC firms Selected controls 
Propensity score 0.010 0.010 
Patent application dummy 0.118 0.086 
Sales growth rates 3.699 21.441 
Profits growth rates  -0.310 -3.537 
Age 12.588 12.832 
Workers 71.202 82.393 
Exporter dummy 0.387 0.382 
Private limited company 0.521 0.577 
Total assets 11424 12343 
Cash flow 564 887 
   
Number of observations 119 463 
Notes: four matches are used to estimate the unobserved outcome of 
each VC-funded firm. I have selected the matches with replacement 
(each control can be chosen more than once) and this is the reason why 
there are 463 controls instead of 476 (4 times 119).  
 
23
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
0 .05 .1 .15
x
Controls Treated
 
Figure 2. Kernel densities of VC firms and selected controls 
 
6. Results and discussion 
Table 6 presents the ATET of VC funding on the share of patenting firms, the number 
of patent applications and the sales growth rate of VC-funded firms. Besides reporting 
estimates for the whole sample of VC-funded firms, Table 6 also provides estimates of 
the ATET for different subsamples to see whether the effectiveness of VCs differs 
across ownership status (public vs. private) and investment stage (early stage vs. 
expansion). In the data section I reported descriptive evidence of the great boost in 
patenting activity that takes place at the precise moment of VC entry. I argued that this 
boost is unlikely to be the consequence of VC entry given that patentable innovations 
often involve projects that take more than one year. In order not to attribute to VC a 
positive effect on firms’ patenting activity that is indeed due to firms’ pre-VC efforts, I 
consider two definitions of the innovation-related variables (patent application dummy 
and the number of patent applications). In the first of these, I take into account the 
number of firms that applied for at least one patent and the number of patent 
applications observed from the exact moment of VC entry (t) onwards. The variables so 
defined are likely to suffer from an upward bias. In the second definition, I leave a 
prudential one-year gap and only consider the number of firms that applied for at least 
one patent and the number of patent applications observed after the first year (t+1) 
following VC entry. If VC really has an effect on firms’ patenting activity, this effect 
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should manifest itself using this definition too and not only when using the previous 
one. 
 
Column (1) considers all VC-funded firms. The estimates indicate that VC does not 
stimulate the patenting behaviour of the invested firms but that it has a positive and 
sizeable effect on the sales growth rate in the two years following the investment. In 
particular, VC-funded firms exhibit a sales growth rate that is almost 20 percentage 
points higher than that of similar non VC-funded firms.  
 
Columns (2) and (3) compare the performance of public and private VCs. Neither of 
them seems to have any impact on firms’ patenting activity. In the case of private VCs, 
it is only possible to find a positive and significant effect when the first and more 
questionable definition of the patenting variables is used. This effect, however, is weak 
and vanishes when the more demanding definition is considered. As for the sales 
growth rate, both public and private VCs have a positive and significant effect on it. 
This effect, however, is notably larger for private VCs. In the data section I showed that 
public VCs did not meet the first desirable feature of a public support program, namely 
the “selection effect” requirement. At this stage, it is possible to state that they do not 
meet the “no treatment effect” requirement either. Recall that the “no selection effect” 
implies that, after controlling for selection, public and private VCs are equally effective. 
The estimates make evident that VCs are clearly superior at stimulating, if not 
innovation, at least the sales growth rate.        
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Table 6. Effect of Venture Capital on the share of patenting firms, on the number of patent 
applications and on sales growth rate 
  
All 
 
(1) 
Public 
VC 
(2) 
Private 
VC 
(3) 
Early 
stage 
(4) 
 
Late 
stage 
(5) 
        
0.029 0.008 0.081 0.007  0.028 Patent application dummy from t 
onwards (0.022) (0.023)  (0.042)* (0.031)  (0.030)
        
0.019 0.008 0.041 -0.015  0.018 Patent application dummy from t+1 
onwards (0.019) (0.023) (0.033) (0.016)  (0.027)
        
        
0.040 -0.011 0.174 -0.007  0.067 Number of patent applications from t 
onwards (0.045) (0.034)  (0.099)* (0.042)  (0.066)
        
0.027 -0.008 0.105 -0.022  0.042 Number of patent applications from 
t+1 onwards (0.032) (0.031) (0.064) (0.026)  (0.048)
        
        
Sales growth rate  0.194 0.095 0.373 0.436  0.071 
  (0.070)*** (0.058)* (0.166)** (0.193)**  (0.061) 
        
Potential control group  164,486 164,486 164,486 164,486  164,486
Treated group  119 66 43 34  71 
        
Notes: The estimates reported are the ATET of VC entry on the share of patenting firms, the number 
of patent applications and sales growth rate. Bias adjusted standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate significance on a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The ATET of VC on the 
share of patenting firms and the number of patent applications has been calculated twice. In the first 
case I considered the effect of VC from the precise moment of entry (t) onwards. In the second case I 
left a prudential one-year gap and only considered the impact of VC on the variables of interest from 
one year after the entry (t+1) onwards.  
 
Finally, columns (4) and (5) report the estimates of early and late stage investments. Not 
surprisingly, neither of the investment stages is effective at promoting innovation. 
Strikingly, however, early stage investments are much more powerful at spurring sales 
growth rates than late stage investments which have no impact at all. Probably, VC 
makes more of a difference in young, small start-ups that lack the resources to expand 
on their own than it does in mature firms that are more self-sufficient and less 
dependent on external aid. This finding should alert us to the convenience of favouring 
early stage investments. This would imply changing the present composition of VC 
investments as they are primarily made up of late stage investments.   
26
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has sought to identify the sequence in which patenting and VC investments 
take place. One possibility is that VC investments spur innovation; another is that firms 
patent before VC entry and VCs simply then exploit such innovations commercially. 
These two sequences have radically different implications in terms of economic policy. 
The former implies that VC should be seen as a valid financing source for innovation, 
while the second warns against it. To ascertain which sequence is prevalent, I have 
explored a unique self-collected dataset containing 164,486 controls and 119 VC-
funded innovative firms which are highly representative of the whole population of 
high-tech firms that received VC investments between 2003 and 2005 in Spain. In the 
analysis I not only report estimates for the whole sample of VC-backed firms, but also 
for a finer breakdown by investment stage (early vs. late stage) and the ownership status 
of the VCs (public vs. private) in order to assess the effectiveness of different types of 
VC investments. 
 
First, using a probit model, I find evidence that firms that have applied for at least one 
patent are significantly more likely to obtain VC investments. Next, using a matching 
approach to correct for any possible selection bias, I evaluate whether VCs really spur 
the innovative activity of the invested firms. Neither for the whole sample of VC-
funded firms nor for the different sub-samples can I find evidence of a positive and 
significant impact of VC on firms’ patenting activity. I do find evidence, however, that 
VC-funded firms have notably larger sales growth rates than non VC-backed firms, 
even after addressing selection. Thus, it seems that the sequence that best describes the 
relationship between VC and innovation is the second one: patenting takes place prior to 
VC entry and VCs mainly focus on the marketing phase. This main result is very robust 
and holds across the different sub-samples of VC-funded firms. Estimates for the 
different sub-samples, however, provide additional insights.  
 
As for ownership, the analysis casts serious doubts on the design of Spain’s public VC. 
Ideally, a proper public support program should be characterized by a notable “selection 
effect” and a reduced “treatment effect”. I find precisely the opposite: the “selection 
effect” is very moderate while the “treatment effect” is sizeable. In particular, private 
VCs are notably more effective than public VCs at stimulating sales. Regarding the 
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investment stage, I find early stage investments to be more effective at spurring sales 
growth rates than late stage investments. This finding highlights the convenience of 
shifting the current composition of investment stages, mostly dominated by late stage, 
in favour of early stage investments.  
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Appendix. Variable definitions and further descriptive statistics 
 
Table A1: Variable definitions 
 
Dependent variables 
Patent application dummy from t onwards: dummy variable that takes value one if the firm patents from 
the exact moment of VC entry onwards.  
Patent application dummy from t+1 onwards: dummy variable that takes value one if the firm patents 
after the first year following VC entry. 
Number of patent applications from t onwards: number of patent applications that take place from the 
moment of VC entry onwards.  
Number of patent applications from t+1 onwards: number of patent applications that take place after the 
first year following VC entry.  
Sales growth rate: average sales growth rate of the two years following VC entry.  
  
Treatment variable 
VC dummy: dummy variable that takes value one if the firm receives the first VC investment at the 
corresponding year and zero otherwise.  
 
Pre-treatment variables used to estimate the propensity score  
Age: firms’ age the year before VC entry. 
Cash flow: firms’ cash flow the year before VC entry. 
Exporter dummy: dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm exports.  
Industry dummies: set of 99 two-digit industry dummies (CNAE Rev. 2).  
Patent application dummy: dummy variable that takes value one if the firm has applied for at least one 
patent (that has been subsequently granted) before VC entry.  
Private limited company dummy: dummy variable that takes value one if the firm adopts the form of a 
private limited company and zero if it adopts the form of a limited liability corporation.  
Profits growth rate: average profits growth rate in the two years preceding VC entry.  
Region dummies: set of 50 province dummies. 
Sales growth rate: average sales growth rate in the two years preceding VC entry.  
Time dummies: set of yearly dummy variables.  
Total assets: total assets of the firm in thousands of Euros.  
Workers: number of employees in the firm. 
 
Other variables shown in the descriptive statistics 
Sales: firms’ sales in thousands of Euros 
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics of all VC firms found in the SABI database 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Patent application 213 0.10 0.37 0 3 
Number of Patents 213 0.16 0.77 0 9 
Exporter dummy 213 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Sales 206 11,041.21 51,970.85 0 637,586 
Sales growth 133 38.99 409.89 -1 4,725 
Profits growth 143 8.99 106.50 -482 999 
Age 213 8.61 11.78 1 85 
Workers 198 68.60 297.09 0 3,964 
Total assets 210 14,750.90 56,981.35 3 641,419 
Private limited company 213 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Cash flow 209 613.27 2,885.36 -3,100 32,006 
 
 
Table A3. Descriptive statistics of the VC firms included in the econometric analysis 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Patent application 119 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Number of Patents 119 0.23 0.94 0 9 
Exporter dummy 119 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Sales 119 10,284.66 20,921.84 0 142,596 
Sales growth 119 3.70 21.11 -1 223 
Profits growth 119 -0.31 16.40 -96 68 
Age 119 12.59 13.42 2 85 
Workers 119 71.20 125.88 1 614 
Total assets 119 11,424.46 18,857.31 6 99,223 
Private limited company 119 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Cash flow 119 564.96 1,385.04 -3,100 6,915 
 
 
Table A4. Descriptive statistics of all the available controls 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Patent application 164,486 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Number of Patents 164,486 0.02 0.22 0 27 
Sales 164,486 2,511.01 10,350.85 0 775,008 
Sales growth 164,486 0.99 43.86 -56 9,139 
Profits growth 164,486 -0.28 15.67 -1,825 1,676 
Age 164,486 8.80 6.62 0 102 
Workers 164,486 18.51 76.77 1 5,200 
Exporter dummy 164,486 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Total assets 164,486 1,772.83 6,631.46 0 256,711 
Private limited company 164,486 0.87 0.34 0 1 
Cash flow 164,486 127.38 1,012.47 -193,798 51,956 
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Table A5. Descriptive statistics of the firms funded by public VCs 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Patent application 66 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Number of Patents 66 0.08 0.32 0 2 
Exporter dummy 66 0.41 0.50 0 1 
Sales 66 11,065.92 25,085.31 0 142,596 
Sales growth 66 4.66 27.86 -1 223 
Profits growth 66 -2.48 19.27 -96 57 
Age 66 13.47 15.80 2 85 
Workers 66 63.08 117.39 1 561 
Total assets 66 11,686.23 20,321.69 6 99,223 
Private limited company 66 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Cash flow 66 589.41 1,251.40 -1,342 6,915 
 
 
Table A6. Descriptive statistics of the firms funded by private VCs 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Patent application 43 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Number of Patents 43 0.49 1.49 0 9 
Exporter dummy 43 0.37 0.49 0 1 
Sales 43 9,826.77 15,713.61 0 72,566 
Sales growth 43 1.81 4.16 -1 23 
Profits growth 43 3.27 12.61 -17 68 
Age 43 12.30 10.33 2 47 
Workers 43 74.44 125.83 2 614 
Total assets 43 9,885.28 15,821.34 206 91,404 
Private limited company 43 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Cash flow 43 657.95 1,515.62 -1,338 5,407 
 
 
Table A7. Descriptive statistics of the firms that receive early VC investments 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Patent application 34 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Number of Patents 34 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Exporter dummy 34 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Sales 34 4,324.82 9,983.53 0 43,715 
Sales growth 34 9.89 38.39 -1 223 
Profits growth 34 -1.55 19.20 -66 57 
Age 34 9.44 14.48 2 85 
Workers 34 33.38 49.15 1 242 
Total assets 34 6,947.29 17,579.86 204 99,223 
Private limited company 34 0.53 0.51 0 1 
Cash flow 34 101.79 1,447.28 -3,100 6,915 
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Table A8. Descriptive statistics of the firms that receive late VC investments 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Patent application 71 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Number of Patents 71 0.30 1.19 0 9 
Exporter dummy 71 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Sales 71 14,672.85 25,256.30 0 142,596 
Sales growth 71 0.66 1.62 -1 9 
Profits growth 71 -0.93 15.57 -96 68 
Age 71 15.82 13.18 2 62 
Workers 71 92.66 141.41 2 614 
Total assets 71 14,462.35 19,368.26 483 97,403 
Private limited company 71 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Cash flow 71 849.35 1,258.84 -1,342 5,407 
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